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A set function assigns a real number to any subset of a universal set. Set functions arise
in many fields of mathematics and applied mathematics, but this survey focusses on
cooperative gameswith transferable utility andon capacitieswhere, formally speaking,
the latter are a subclass of the former. Within these applications, the paper focusses
on (i) the structure of polyhedra generated by capacities and several special classes of
capacities; (ii) the structure of polyhedra generated by supermodular games; (iii) the
structure of the core and variations on the core of capacities and games.
A game for player set N is a function v : 2N → R satisfying v(∅) = 0. A capacity
is a monotonic game (that is, S ⊆ T implies v(S) ≤ v(T )) such that v(N ) = 1.
A common interpretation of a capacity is that now the set N is the set of states (of
the world) and the numbers v(S) are probabilities, so v is a possibly non-additive
probability measure.
A first result in the paper (Theorem 1, attributed to Stanley 1986) states that the set
of capacities is polytope with the set of simple games (capacities with v(S) ∈ {0, 1})
as extreme points. The number of simple games increases exponentially with the
cardinality of N and, according to the paper, is only known for n ≤ 9, where n = |N |.
A p-additive capacity (p ∈ {1, . . . , n}) is a capacity such that its Möbius transform
attaches value 0 to all sets S with |S| > p. Such a capacity is completely determined
by its values on sets with cardinality at most p. For instance, for p = 1 one obtains
additive capacities. The set of 2-additive capacities is again a polytope,with n2 extreme
points, but nothing seems to be known for p > 2 (Miranda et al. 2006).
This comment refers to the invited paper available at doi:10.1007/s11750-016-0421-4.
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A k-ary capacity (k ∈ N) assigns to each vector in {0, 1, . . . , k}N a real number.
The case k = 1 returns the usual capacities, since we can identify a vector with zeros
and ones with a coalition. This concept corresponds to the concept of a multichoice
game in game theory. The extreme points of the polytope of k-ary capacities are the
k-ary simple games (Theorem 4, which thus extends Theorem 1). This result still holds
for 2-additive k-ary capacities: the extreme points of the polytope of 2-additive k-ary
capacities are the 0–1-valued 2-additive k-ary capacities (Theorem 5).
The remainder of the survey focusses on games. The extremal rays of the cone of
zero-normalized supermodular (convex) games are described (Section 6). Sections 7
and 8 focus on the core: the core of a game v is the set {x ∈ RN | x(S) := ∑i∈S xi ≥
v(S)∀S ∈ 2N , x(N ) = v(N )}. The Bondareva–Shapley theorem is reviewed and
the relation with the Weber set. The paper (Section 7) mentions several results on the
core of restricted games, which means that the core inequalities only have to hold for
a subset of 2N . In such a case, the core is not necessarily bounded. Special attention
is paid to supermodular games with restricted cooperation in Theorems 13 and 14
(Grabisch and Sudhölter 2012).
The core of a game v can be seen as a collection of (1-)additive games which
pointwise (per coalition) dominate v and are efficient. Section 8 presents an extension
to the so-called k-additive core, consisting of k-additive games that pointwise dominate
v (Vassil’ev 1978;Miranda andGrabisch 2010). For k ≥ 2 the k-additive core is always
nonempty. In fact, the k-additive core turns out to be a very large set (Theorem 17),
a result which is derived by establishing a connection with the selectope (Derks et al.
2000). The survey concludes with an examination of the vertices of the k-additive
core.
This is an excellent survey. In relatively few pages, the author manages to discuss
many topics inmuchmore detail and depth than onewould expect in such a short paper.
Most of the concepts considered here have well-understood and clear interpretations
in game theory, although this is perhaps less true of the k-additive core, as the author
also notes. As far as capacities are concerned, the interpretation in decision theory is
that of a generalized, not per se additive probabilitymeasure (used, e.g., in the Choquet
integral), and it would be interesting to reflect on the question whether the concepts
studied here can be interpreted in a similar vein. For instance, how to interpret a k-ary
capacity if the elements of N are states of the world and the values of the capacity
are probabilities? Is the Möbius transform of a capacity just a technical device, or
does it also have an interesting interpretation in decision theory, similarly as it has
an interpretation in terms of dividends in the game model? It is well known and also
mentioned in the survey that the core of a capacity and in particular a supermodular
capacity has interesting applications in decision theory, e.g., Schmeidler (1986, 1989).
It may also be added that set functions and more precisely (pseudo-) Boolean func-
tions have applications in social choice theory. In particular, they can be used to prove
quantitative versions of the famous Arrow and Gibbard–Satterthwaite impossibility
theorems. For instance, in the latter case such a result tells us how close we get to
dictatorship, depending on the amount of manipulability we are willing to accept. See
the studies by Friedgut et al. (2011) and Kalai (2002).
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